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1. Introduction 
Jewish law and its research are hardly keeping pace with the acceleration of 
technological advancement and with emerging ethical technological dilemmas (or techno-
ethics, as distinguished from bioethics). The so-
digital, artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic technologies raises many ethical and societal 
challenges, which manifest in the civilian arena, and in military ethics, including weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). In Christian, Islamic, and Eastern religions, there are 
discussions of these challenges,2 and in halakhic3 and scholarly-relevant literature too,4 
even if it still requires further attention. This discourse-gap is especially significant in the 
case of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS, to be explained in what follows). The 
objective of the present article is to help to fill in that lacuna, and to examine the halakhic-
moral status of AWS, by clarifying the humane foundations of the philosophy of 
technology (that can, in its turn, be enriched by Judaism,5 or by Jewish law and values). 
This article is based on the presupposition that ethical judgements framed in Jewish legal 
terms are premised on a humane6 view of the embodied, reasoning and caring person  of 
a person who can engage in meaningful decision-making about moral issues in general, 
and more specifically about matters of life and death (dinei nefashot).7 
To be clear at the outset, the basic orientation of this study is not pacifist. Harming 
or killing in self-defense is permitted and even commanded in Jewish tradition, as in most 
human civilizations.8 At the same time, Israelis consider the IDF a moral army because it 
submits itself to ethical laws and to the principle of tohar haneshek (purity of arms).9 As 
Rabbi Shai Held has observed,10 there are two main lessons for Jews to draw from the 
 
2 See the various articles included in the volume by S.H. Hashmi and S.P. Lee (eds.), Ethics and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives (Cambridge, 2004). 
3 A Responsa Project database search finds only one appearance of the phrase 
in   
 (Jerusalem, 1949) §15 (30-31) is also an exception. 
Regensburg considered whether the use of chemical and nuclear weapons should be halakhically prohibited, 
Israeli Army according to the Torah in the First Years of the Founding of 
and M. Bar-On (eds.), The Two Sides of the Bridge: Religion and State in the First Years of the State 
(Jerusalem, 2002), 414-434. 
4 s (ed.), 
Confronting Omnicide: Jewish Reflections on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Northvale, New Jersey, 1991), 
69- ibid., 209-
War and the Prohibition of Wanton Destru ibid., 100- ewish Understanding of 
ibid., 82-  Bible and the Holocaust: Three Sources for Jewish 
Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 385-401. Stuart Cohen 
comments that the ethics of nuclear warfare is found mostly in English-written Jewish halakhah, and much 
less in Hebrew-Israeli works. See S. Cohen,  (Burlington 
VT, 2013), 87. 
5 Using the term uppose any a-priori and monolithic character of the 
include voices that are more essential to its common characterization. Compare D. Boyarin, Carnal Israel: 
Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley, 1993), 22. 
6 
rather denotes a prescriptive ethical sense. 
7 I thank the anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
8 As in the talmudic case of rodef (see below n.50). This idea runs counter to a Whitney Museum exhibition 
that  all the same. Is 
there is no authentic difference between organized violent acts, of the IDF and the Gestapo? As an Israeli 
citizen and as a former tank commander, I fiercely reject this equivalence, as the IDF is subject to ethical 
values and critique which guide its action. 
9 See A. Kasher, Military Ethics [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, 1996), 231-238. 
10 See his talk on A.J. Heschel at the Tikvah Center (NYU, Feb. 21, 2014), at: 
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Holocaust: (1) Jews should have power, and (2) there must be a constant moral critique 
regarding the practice of this power.11 That means that the Israeli public must assess the 
actions taken by the IDF, as body subject to a democratically elected Israeli government,12 
including the possible use of AWS. 
In this introductory section, I will do three things. I will briefly explain what AWS 
are. Then, I will describe the main global public concerns about them and objections to 
them. Finally, I will identify the main biblical and halakhic principles that accord with 
these concerns.13 We begin by explaining what AWS are. 
 
1.1. What are AWS? 
AWS are robots of various forms that have the technical capacity, by means of 
advanced technologies, such as AI,14 GPS, and facial recognition, to approach targets, 
identify them, and then harm or destroy them without human involvement.15 This article 
does not relate to static-based, defensive AWS (such as land mines or defensive surface-
to-air AWS, such as missiles), which seems morally permissible and even obligatory 
according to the principle of self-defense (see below). In offensive AWS, humans are 
out 16 At first glance, this may 
not seem qualitatively different than the ancient development of the bow and arrow.17 Both 
allowed the distancing of the weapon from the combatant and opened the door for non-
discriminate shooting. To consider modern weapons, armies already use land and naval 
mines, hand grenades, canons, and bombs. All of these are automatic and thus autonomous 
in a simple sense. The difference is that AWS, as AI-based inventions, possess a pro-active 
 
 
1.2. Global Responses 
The main reference for military ethics in terms of International Laws of War is the 
Fourth Geneva Convention (1949),18 as well as other treaties which prohibit and limit the 
production, proliferation, and use of WMD  be they nuclear, chemical, biological, or 
 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLmhM92BztY (1:01:00 onwards). 
11 The dialectics between Jewish vulnerability and sovereignty is at the core of Ehud Luz, Wrestling with an 
Angel: Power, Morality, and Jewish Identity, trans. M. Swirsky (New Haven: 2003). 
12 For an argument that preventing the possibility of moral critique is, in itself, harmful to the 
see M. Kremnitzer and N.S. Haaretz (Oct. 3, 
s editors. 
13 In holding that for the discussion about AWS to be fruitful it must be interdisciplinary, I follow P.W. 
Singer, orality When it Comes to New 
Journal of Military Ethics 9 (2010), 299-312. 
14 This article does not discuss the technical aspects of current non-linear programming software, namely 
ly quantic computing and the development of quantum 
 
15 Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV), like drones, are often perceived as autonomous weapons, but they are 
not truly autonomous insofar as they are human opera
Pr Journal of Military Ethics 9 (2010), 342-368, 
who rejects AWS while endorsing UAV as the most ethical military means to deploy. This kind of distinction 
m  (Uninhabited AV) into  (AV operated from a 
katmam Israel Hayom (April 26, 2016). 
16 In-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that 
can select targets and deliver force only with a human command; Human on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that 
can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robot
actions; and Human out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering 
 
17  
18 Basic information about International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is found at the website of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions). 
 
94 JLAS XXIX: The Impact of Science, Technology, and Knowledge 
 
other. A major concern regarding AWS, as enabling the profiled targeting of a virtually 
endless amount of people, is whether it should indeed be considered a non-conventional 
weapon. This presumed non-conventionality may in fact be a double-edged sword. As 
Peter Asaro has pointed out, through hacking or even through its own autonomy AWS may 
(1) start an accidental war and (2) turn against the nation it should have been defending.19 
If the constr 20 were 
feasible and did prove ethical, AWS might raise no greater a challenge than that of a 
technologically enhanced human soldier. However, many scholars and intellectuals (the 
leading group includes Stuart Russell, Toby Walsh, and Mary Wareham) are worried that 
AWS are a moral red line, and have launched international campaigns against the 
development and use of AWS.21 A landmark in the field of AWS is the 2012 report by the 
International Human Rights Clinic 
The Case Aga 22 Its main argument is that robots are by definition unable 
to be adequately subject to ethical considerations nor capable of emotional care.23 To state 
this from a pragmatic philosophical perspective, fallibility is an essential property of human 
deliberation and so humane juridical discretion is an important component of law, as has 
been recognized in the philosophy of Jewish law.24 Facing present-day attempts to 
represent humane reasoning in algorithm form,25 there is a need to inquire whether the non-
humane computerized forms of decision-making are a worthy substitute to humane moral 
discretion.26 AWS should be also examined against international normative standards. In 
Israel, however, the difficulties of AWS are hardly discussed.27 
 
1.3. Tentative Contextualization of AWS in Halakhic Ethics  
The above considerations will be relevant in this article, which assumes that the 
way in which non-Jews conceive ethical normativity is important in Judaism.28 Hence the 
 
19 n P. Brey et al. (eds.), Current Issues in Computing and 
Philosophy (Amsterdam, 2008), 50-64, esp. 54-58. 
20 The term was proposed by W. Wallach and C. Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong 
(Oxford, 2010). 
21 www.stopkillerrobots.org); The Future of Life Institute issued the 2015 
futureoflife.org/open-letter-
autonomous-weapons). It is signed by nearly 4,000 AI/Robotics researchers and more than 20,000 other 
scholars. 
22 In collaboration with Human Rights Watch . 
Another example is an open letter by leading AI scientists, supporting a boycott of the Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), in order to prevent an arms race (The Guardian, April 5, 2018). 
23 The inherent problem of formalizing ethics, and the resulting indispensability of human discretion, is 
rence, which came to be vital for modern war 
ethics. 
24 For instance, see H. Ben-Menahem, Judicial Deviation in Talmudic Law: Governed by Men, Not by Rules 
(Boston: 1991); N.S. ic 
 Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 27:1 (2019), 86-135. 
25 when/if x 
 
26 AI & Society 34:1 (2019), 
129-136. 
27 in Warfare: 
s.), Autonomous Weapons Systems: 
Law, Ethics, Policy (Cambridge, 2016), 245-284; Liran Antebi of the INSS (see the interview with her in 
Makor Rishon, March 28, 2018); Idan Lan
ew] (June 14, 2018, available at https://idanlandau.com
Idkun Estrategi 21 (2018), 75-86. 
Antebi is recommending that Israel will respect the IHL, but she does not address the inner-political risks 
that AWS poses to the sustainment of democratic civic life. 
28  the Eyes of the Nations as a 
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halakhic principle of dina de-malkhuta dina (DDD),29 which acknowledges the 
authoritative value of those non-Jewish political norms as long as they do not violate the 
Noahide law. In a similar vein, halakhic authorities have recognized that prima facie 
military ethics is not something Halakhah30 should  dismiss.31 Universal prima facie ethics 
became a significant point of reference for Zionist rabbis of the 20th century32 who 
acknowledged the halakhic legitimacy of the UN and of international law.33 As R. Shlomo 
Goren stated, when dealing with military matters of life and death of non-Jews, not only 
stringency (din) but also mercy (mishnat ) should be practiced.34 It follows that 
humane ethics, or a plain human sense of morality, which is significant in Jewish law,35 is 
relevant to AWS too, and what the nations of the world and international law state about 
AWS should thus be taken into account. 
Addressing techno-ethical dilemmas, in their broader contexts, is a demanding task. 
Hans Jonas already argued that the tremendous technological extension of human 
capacities requires a parallel elaboration of ethical duties.36 As we shall see below, the 
halakhic discussion of techno-ethics requires a similar hermeneutic extension. A main 
challenge in contemporary human- and social-sciences is the gulf between secularists, who 
en come to the 
table with anti-
mankind), or non-humanistic bias. In this way, main-stream military-robot ethicists barely 
refer to biblical sources37 (out of indifference, or even hostility toward traditionalist 
 
Am lebadad, Moledet Upzurah 
(Tel Aviv, 2006), 88-123. This halakhic attentiveness is based on the humane universalistic currents in 
Judaism, as well as on acknowledging that normativity exists beyond Israel too. See correspondingly M. 
Harvard Theological Review 93 
(2000), 101- olerance in the Teachings of the 
The Edah Journal 1 (2000), 1-24. 
29 See B.K. 113b; B.B. 54b, and more. For a comprehensive review of talmudic and the later halakhic material, 
see S  Shiloh, The Law of the Kingdom is Law [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 1974). 
30 
Tradition 20 [1982], 91-100), I will use those terms here 
interchangeably. 
31 In regard to Rabbi Shaul Yisra Ammud 
Hayemini [Tel Aviv: 1966], §16d, 168-
indiscriminate violence against Arab civilians as retaliation for violence of this sort perpetrated against Jews. 
Religious Zionism, Jewish 
Law, and the Morality of War: How Five Ra  
[Oxford, 2017], 161. 
32 This article does not address the topics of militarism, or militant ethos, within various branches of the 
Jewish Israeli society, or the broader question of Jews and power, as addressed by Anita Shapira, Ehud Luz, 
Ruth Wisse, Derek Penslar and other scholars. For a consideration of the relevant literature, see recently . 
Ben- Journal of Jewish Thought & 
Philosophy 25 (2017), 256-278, especially 256-26 . 
33 There are, of course, many controv
endorse the more binding interpretation of DDD regarding the UN and the International Law, and those (like 
Rabbis S. Aviner and E. Melamed) who insist that national security interests need not be subject to 
universalist ethical constraints. See A. Israel-
v 
Univerrsity, 2012). 
34 amah, 3 vols. (Jerusalem: 198 -199 ), vol. 1, 28-29.  
35 The Journal of Religious 
Ethics 23 (1995), 39-67. 
36 See his The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, trans. H. Jonas 
and D. Herr (Chicago: 1984), esp. chapters 1-2 (1-50). 
37 the US 
Department of Navy by P. Lin, G. Bekey, and K. Abney (Unpublished paper, California State University, 
San Luis Obispo
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approaches38 and toward religion as merely increasing political violence39).  
It may thus come as a surprise, in the modern intellectual atmosphere, to propose 
that the above universal concerns about AWS may have some roots in biblical sources. 
Nonetheless, early Jewish texts do provide a grounding for these concerns, and ethical 
principles40 that may instruct us concerning new conditions.41 The first of these ethical 
principles is createdness in the image of God (or imago-Dei).42 Its main ramification in the 
present case is the prohibition of unjustified killing.43 Based on the biblical narrative of 
createdness in the image of God (Gen. 1:27), M. Sanh. 4:5 aptly states that the unnecessary 
killing of one human being44 is equal to the destruction of the entirety of humanity.45 An 
additional relevant biblical principle is responsibility, which has tremendous ramifications 
Lev. 19:16);46 what is right and Deut. 
Deut. 16:20). In addition, biblical narrative expresses 
legal teachings.47 In other words, although the Bible lacks a systematic treatise of war ethics 
(and of many other topics), it contains a relevant ethical orientation. There are, indeed, 
implicit sensibilities in early Jewish tradition regarding WMD,48 which locate AWS as a 
serious halakhic dilemma.  
Human agency as the basis of self-defense and of the concurrent right to kill 
warring enemies was enacted throughout history.49 This principle was formulated 
 
[Hebrew], umin 25 (2005), 426-438, at 434, note 29. Sharir argues that Asa Kasher is basing the ethics 
of the IDF on democracy, at the exclusion of Jewish tradition. 
38 For a definition of a middle-way approach to tradition, which is sympathetic and critical, See Y. Yadgar, 
Cogent Social Sciences 1 (2015), 1-17. 
39 See W.T. Cavanagh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict 
(Oxford, 2009). A basic condition for this biased attitude towards religious traditions is what Peter L. Berger 
The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of 
Religion (New York: 1990), 105-126, 179-186. A fertile soil for the anti-traditional stance is the empiricist 
dogma of Logical-Positivism (as in Rudolf Carnap and others), which orders that immediate observable data 
is all  
40 The Rabbinic Mind (New York, 1972), 1-58. 
41  
42 Y. Lorberbaum, (New York, 2015). On 
the humane value of  see below, section 3.3. 
43 
given norm, and only against this general background was it possible to develop two particular concepts of 
com Law, Politics, and 
Morality in Judaism [Princeton, 2006], 169-181, at 174). For a similar line of reasoning see J.D. Bleich, 
 
44 
Without a Purpose to Defend Oneself or Others Is Not Justified Self-Defense a Reply to 
[Hebrew], 17 Mishpat Umimshal, , 564 (2016). 
45 -Meqayyem Nefesh 
[Hebrew], 40 (1970), 268-284, and idem, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. I. Abrahams 
(Jerusalem, 1975), 214-254. 
46 Translations of biblical verses throughout this article are cited from the NJPS edition with some 
modifications. 
47 On the persistence of this inter-connectivity in rabbinic tradition, see B.S. Wimpfheimer, Narrating the 
Law: A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories (Philadelphia, 2011). 
48 r conclusive answer to the 
that the religious background reinforces the basic, intuitive obligation to prevent or remove hazards to the 
continuat  
49 See M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York, 1977), 
151. 
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im ba le-horgekha hashkem le-horgo Ber. 58a).50 When we look to 
Biblical sources attentively, we find that even such a justified killing involved self-risking: 
Judg. 5:18). This raises substantial questions 
when the act of killing is detached from human agents and becomes autonomous.51 To state 
le expects that even murderers will be 
by humans his blood 
shall be shed, for in the image of God, He mad Gen. 9:6). Based on a similar 
principle of responsibility, Jewish tradition has been strict about the requirement of direct 
human involvement in animal slaughter.52 As some European states ban Jewish ritual 
slaughter in favor of moving toward a fully automated slaughter-house, Jewish law 
continues to require a human slaughterer for the act of taking the life of animals. By the 
logic of miqal  (or a fortiori), we may infer that Jewish law is presumably no less 
considerate regarding the life of humans.53 
 With this introduction in place, we turn to examine the status of AWS in Jewish 
law. This article does not presume to determine a halakhic ruling, but to contribute to the 
research and development of halakhic discourse regarding AWS, and to the scholarship of 
halakhah and techno-ethics more broadly. The article runs as follows: Section 2 
 AWS within the context of Jewish law, 
techno-ethics and halakhic war ethics. Section 3 Techno-
suggests several relational-pragmatist ethical premises of a humane and halakhic 
techno-ethics. Section 4 
controversy over the morality of AWS, arguing that a careful approach should be adopted. 
To flesh out the high stakes of moral agency, section 5 Sword 
m the halakhic-ethical standpoint, in the 
context of two formative biblical stories on political violence. On the basis of these 
halakhic-political observations, section 6 
potential technological disruptions to Israeli democracy from AWS.54 The final section (7, 
s on the possible contribution of Jewish law to techno-ethics more 
broadly in the twenty first century. 
 
2. What do AWS have to do with Jewish Law? 
In this section I explain why and in which ways AWS, a topic which is almost absent from 
existing halakhic discourse, is of essential halakhic value. The first sub-section locates 
AWS, as technology, within halakhic discourse. The second sub-section contextualizes 
AWS within hilkhot tsava (Jewish laws of war). 
 
2.1. Halakhah and Techno-Ethics: Sketching the Challenge 
Many Jewish scholars, including rabbis and public intellectuals, have addressed pressing 
techno-ethical issues from the perspectives of halakhah and aggadah. These scholars 
 
50 din rodef Sanh. 72b). For a consideration of the application of 
thi haba 
lehorgekha hashkem lehorgo  1 (1980), 343-348. 
51 ty Scholarship Series (2002), 2-
8, and the below discussion (sections 4-5). 
52 See chapters 1-2 of . 
53 Shabbat 
Shalom 1116 (5779/2019). 
54 The attention given throughout this article to the IDF, rather than to other armies, is a product of my Jewish 
Israeli affilia
on its morality. 
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include Hans Jonas,55 J. David Bleich,56 Eliezer Schweid,57 Israel Rosen,58 Avraham 
Steinberg,59 Elliot N. Dorff,60 Norbert Samuelson and ava Tirosh-Samuelson,61 Na um 
Eliezer Rabinovitch,62 Yuval Cherlow,63 Daniel Nevins,64 Tehillah Schwartz-Altshuler,65 
Israel (Roly) Belfer,66 and others. Yoav Sorek has made an observation regarding the need 
to address the new techno-ethical challenges properly: 
 
The developments in medical research, in human genetics and computer science 
ble that already now there 
ld be a shame 
wonderous age due to the stagnation or weakness of the ones who presume to 
67 
 
In a parallel argument by Yedidiah . Stern, contemporary halakhic authorities are 
criticized for not addressing the challenge of public halakhic affairs (hilkhot- ibbur) 
properly.68 It seems that the rise of a halakhic formalistic (or legalistic) tendency in 
 
55 idem, Philosophical Essays: 
From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood, New Jersey, 1974), 168-
to Jewish thought is profound, and I will refer to some of it below. See C. Wiese, The Life and Thought of 
Hans Jonas: Jewish Dimensions (Waltham, MA, 2007), 87-149; and the articles by Ron Margolin, Lawrence 
Vogel, and various others, in H. Tirosh-Samuelson and C. Wiese (ed.), The Legacy of Hans Jonas: Judaism 
and the Phenomenon of Life (Leiden, 2008). 
56 Tradition 45 (2012), 81-95. 
57 -Samuelson and A.W. Hughes (eds.), Eliezer 
Schweid: The Responsibility of Jewish Philosophy (Leiden, 2013), 159-223.  
58  36 (2016), 153-161.  
59 See his seven volume Encyclopedia of Medicine and Jewish Law [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 2006). 
60 The B in: C. Mercer and D.F. 
Maher (eds.), Transhumanism and the Body: The World Religions Speak (New York, 2014), 101-120. 
61 -Samuelson and K.L. Mossman (eds.), Building 
Better Humans? Refocusing the Debate on Transhumanism (Frankfurt, 2011), 105-132. 
62 brew],  36 (2016), 
146-152.  
63  81 (2017), 
29-32. 
64 CJLS 
June 19, 2019). I thank Rabbi Nevins for sharing with me this pioneering responsum. Its title indicates that 
it relates to , but in fact it has tremendous halakhic-humane value for deliberating many 
techno-ethical dilemmas in the areas of im, Yor , and . 
65 Schwartz-Altshuler is not a halakhic author, but a scholar of tech-regulation. However, her reasoned public 
voice in techno-ethical questions in the Jewish-Israeli sphere is profound. For example, her argument in an 
article in Makor Rishon (22 February 2018) about some social-democratic concerns posed by police uses of 
AI. A similar remark concerning a Jewish-ethical significance applies, to my mind, to additional scholars 
such has Yuval Dror (and his 2019 book Hidden Code), who examine new technologies ethically. 
66 -Computer/Brain- Assia Book 15 (2015), 15-38. 
67 The Israeli Covenant [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, 2015), 261. 
68 , Mishpat uMimshal 4 (1997), 
215-242; See recently Jewish Law and Zionism: Halakhic Ramifications of National Sovereignty, Y.Z. Stern 
and Y. Sheleg (eds
pertains to the process of individualistic religionizing 
 How Judaism Became a Religion: An Introduction to Modern Jewish 
Thought (Princeton, 2011). 
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modernity,69 and more intensively in recent decades,70 makes it harder to apply Jewish law 
properly in new situations generating techno-ethical questions. It is true that we often find 
rabbinic capacity to permit the use of military force in controversial cases.71 However, the 
rabbinic silence on the topic of AWS may not be an indication of its ethical-halakhic 
permissibility. It may be the case that stringent formalism in some areas comes at the 
expense of over-permissiveness on others. 
One way to move forward is by acknowledging, in line with some leading scholars 
of Jewish law, that it is not a mere set of formal commands.72 As Eliezer Berkovits 
contended, following R. Yosef Albo,73 the codes of the past do not cover all the renewing 
realities and circumstances.74 Rather, Jewish law is a rich instruction comprised of both 
halakhah and aggadah - 75 
has a significant role in minding the gaps between law and renewing life circumstances. 
Given the place that humane morality has in halakhah,76 Jewish law denies a sharp 
formalistic separation of law and morality.77 Consequentially, our interest here is the 
legality of AWS,78 which not foreign to Jewish law.79 
In other words, this article recognizes the wider phenomenon described by Stuart 
-related texts in the 
traditional Jewish halakhic ed considerable intellectual energies 
and talents in quasi-archeological search for su
 
69 On the robust influence of rigid, European systems of law on halakhah, see L. Batnitzky, 
Diné Israel 26-27 (2009-10), 7-44. 
Batnitzky calls attention to the influence of the German Rechtsstaat on Rabbi Samsun Rapha
thought, and more widely, on modern halakhah. On the implicit influence of the Cartesian, non-pragmatic 
side of modernity on the process of halakhic stringency, see -130. See also 
Command Theor
Scharfstein (eds.), Interpretation in Religion (Leiden, 1992), 181-206. 
70 See 
Tradition 28 (1994), 64-
Oxford Handbook of Jewish Studies (Oxford, 2002), 643-679. 
71 sui generis and 
thus demands greater amount of self-risk as well. See Cohen, Divine Service, 151. 
72 As Yeshay
Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State, E. Goldman (ed. and trans.) (Cambridge, 1992), 3-30. For a 
 
Journal of Religious Ethics 43:1 (2015), 146-168. 
73  book 3, trans. I. Husik (Philadelphia, 1930), chapter 23, 201-207. 
74 Hence the special role of the oral law in interpreting Mosaic, written law. See E. Berkovits, Not in Heaven: 
The Nature and Function of Jewish Law (Jerusalem, 2010), 69. Compare N. Gutel, Changes of Nature in 
Halakhah [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 1995); M. Lorberbaum, Politics and the Limits of Law: Secularizing the 
Political in Medieval Jewish Thought (Palo Alto, 2001), 35-52. 
75 Foreword: Nomos and 
Harvard Law Review 97 (1983), 4, 68. 
76 Natural Law in Judaism (Cambridge, 
C has argued that the radical theological voluntarism found in medieval 
Islamic and Christian traditions is not typical in halakhic discourse. 
77  
[Hebrew], in: A. Ravitzky and A. Rosenak (eds.), New Streams in the Philosophy of Halakhah (Jerusalem, 
200 ), 43-63. For an argument that such a clear-
halakhically sustainable, see New Streams 
in the Philosophy of Halakhah, 233-257. 
78 Cardozo Law 
Review 36 (2015) 1837, 1915. Despite the attempt to regulate AWS, it is hard to impossible to do so, and 
hence the concerns discussed in the present article (see below, section 4.2). 
79 -71. 
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80 This observation 
regarding the insufficiency of halakhic war ethics turns us to examine the proper status of 
AWS. 
 
2.2. Jewish Law and War Ethics: Narrowing down the case 
As just noted, modernity raised a full set of ethical questions regarding technology that 
halakhic authorities at times overlooked. The challenge of AWS, nonetheless, is an extreme 
example.81 In this subsection I will aim to contextualize the topic of AWS within Jewish 
law, and also to suggest why the topic was halakhically overlooked.  
There are in biblical law some treatments of military procedures, such as the 
authority to conscript civil population (Deut. 20:1-8; 1 Sam. 8:11-12), to initiate wars 
(Deut. 17), to call for surrender (Deut. ), to lay siege (Deut. 20, 22), to take captives 
(Deut. 21:10-14), and so on.82 However, one finds no systematic or rule-based treatment 
of war ethics in the Bible and in early oral law83  as in the modern principles of non-
combatant civilian immunity (or distinction between combatants and civilians) or the 
standards for necessity and proportionality in using military force.84 This phenomenon 
might account for the difficulty of renewing, and in fact developing, halakhic war ethics in 
modern times. 
The existence of cyber war has been noticed by Israeli rabbis in the context of 
halakhic duties and of the social status of rear line soldiers, as compared to combatants.85 
In recent years, senior IDF commanders have publicly advocated for the use of robots and 
AWS.86 Some advocate not only a single autonomous weapon, but a full 
of constant human direction.87 However, following Rav Kook who taught that the question 
 
80 Cohen, Divine Service, 153.
 11 (2002), 97-104, who similarly states (97) that there is no tradition of halakhic ruling on the topic.
This, however, does not mean that such tradition cannot be halakhically reconstructed. See, for example, 
-Leer Jerusalem Institute (Dec. 18, 2018) on the acute need to establish 
rights severely. 
81 Rabbi Yehuda Brandes, for example, appreciates the merits of the virtual battlef
in: S. Weinberger and A. Beitner [eds.], -  [Beit El, 2007], 155-179, esp. 161), but seems 
indifferent to the tremendous risks of techno-disruptions. On the other hand, Brandes considers non-Jewish 
ethical norms Jewish Law and Zionism, 17-44, at 31). 
82 
Violence and the Value of Life in Jewish Tradition (Jerusalem, 1984), 18-25. On the primitive war techniques 
utilized in the ancient near East, see I. Yadin, War Doctrine in Biblical Lands [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan, 1963).  
83 The legal lacunas found in biblical war narratives (for instance, 1 Sam. 30:2 -25) may testify to this lack 
of systematic legal treatment. Compare M. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford, 1989), 
91-280, esp. 240. 
84 See M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 127ff. War ethics in general and Jewish war ethics are wide topics, 
and there is no intention to exhaust them here. The main purpose of the above is to pave the methodological 
way towards the narrower discussion of AWS.  
85 
combat is carried out by rear soldiers ( ) whose weapon is keyboard and mouse rather than a 
Ha- , 
221-238, at 237). 
86 Brigadier General Ziv Avtalion contend
Israel Hayom, July 26, 2017).  
87 Prime Minister Binyamin Netan
goal (Makor Rishon, June 28, 2018). Brig
] is a strategic goal of the IDF. He predicts tha
[ ] will command the tank crew and determine what to do and who to shoot ( , 
Nov 16, 2017). This trajectory is promoted in the Israeli media by journalists who propagate the use of robots. 
Israel Hayom (April 10, 2017), 8-10, and compare 
below n.295. 
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of military ethics is not a legal wasteland exempt from any halakhic-ethical reasoning,88 
rabbinic authorities could have approached the question of AWS with less fascination. 
And, in accordance with his sentence cited in the opening of this article, Kook claimed that 
 
 
Such an approach recognizes, as Rabbi Eliezer Shenwald (a prominent 
contemporary authority in halakhic laws of war) does, that when it is not clear how a new 
case is covered by halakhah, one must discover the principal status (or geder) of the new 
phenomenon.89 At the very least, that should have resulted in conceptualizing AWS as an 
extension of the human individuals who operate it  by utilizing the categories pertaining 
to a secondary or indirect operation, such as grama,90 -ko o, and -sheni.91 These 
categories, generally, refer to causing damage to fellow human beings and to their property, 
by means of natural objects or animals, for example by lighting a fire which is 
unintentionally extended by sudden wind.92 This is the least that should have occurred even 
if these categories are too limited to encompass the far-reaching technological possibilities 
of the AWS, or civil torts as R. Aharon Lichtenstein argued two decades ago: 
 
In the [present-day] developing technological reality, the ability to inflict damages, 
physical and virtual, without being considering criminal by Na
reasing. The [virtual] torts may be more abstract and the 
process of harm more indirect than the minimal threshold of din garmei. The 
from his actions, based on the time gap between the action and reaction, and by 
or tort 
exemption?93   
 
 prompted him to call upon rabbinic authorities to rise to the 
challenge of addressing halakhically the new autonomous technological tools. However, 
despite (or perhaps, due to) the deep ethical-halakhic problem, the halakhic challenge of 
AWS has not been noticed. One possible explanation for ignoring the substantial ethical 
challenges of the new warfare is the fact that the halakhic attention given to military issues 
in Israel focuses predominantly on the perspective of the individual religious soldier. With 
-oriented hilkhot 
tsava,94 halakhic attention centers on how such a soldier can avoid transgressing 
 
88 Rabbi A.I.H Kook contended in responsa published in Mishpat Cohen ([Jerusalem, 1966] §§142-144, 148) 
horaa
dinei malkhut not justify every possible military means or strategy, 
of human-sacrifice (compare Cohen, Divine Service, 151). On the role of purposiveness and ethicality in 
Halakhah [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 2007), 326-364. 
89 Hebrew], in: E. Shenwald (ed.), Sefer Harel: Israeli Military in Torah Perspective 
 2002), 119-184, esp. 122-133. 
90 As distinct from garmei (see B.K. Dina 
deGarmei [Hebrew], in A. Gordin and D. Feldman (eds.), 
deGarmei (Alon Shvut, 2000), 13-45. 
91 Compare Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Assault and Damage 6:10-16. On the application of the 
 and  in the context of delegation in halakhah, and concerning their possible 
applications for halakhic-ethics relating to autonomous cars, see Y  
 [Hebrew],  38 (2018), 373-386, at 380-382. See the 
concise d -22, and below n.107. 
92 See B.K. 60a. 
93 , 200. 
94 Another example is Rabbi 
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prohibitions relating to Shabbat and Holy days, dietary laws, ritual purity (and so on), and 
can perform obligatory ritual duties pertaining to prayer, Shabbat and holy days when they 
conflict with military service tasks.95 In the hilkhot tsava compiled by the former IDF Chief 
Rabbi, the late Avi ai Ron ki, and by the present IDF Chief Rabbi, Eyal Karim, the 
treatment of ethical-collective concerns in conducting military affairs is minor.96 
Moreover, the limited attention given to the national and institutional dimension of 
hilkhot tsava97 focuses on more formal ritualistic issues like the establishment of monarchy 
as it relates to the biblical command to abolish (Deut. 25:19);98 the appointment 
of kohen meshua  mil amah (Deut. 20:1-999), and so on. At most, there have been in 
normative-laden100 Jewish tradition (NLJT) discussions of the theory of war in regard to 
mandatory/commanded (mi vah) war versus discretionary (reshut) war.101 A relevant 
milestone for connecting those discussions to AWS, is the debate between Michael Walzer 
and Aviezer Ravitz 102 However, 
they do not discuss the unique questions raised by AWS, of how a specific military act is 
produced, 103 rather than the question of the moral justification of war in the first place.  
 The ethical-halakhic questions raised by offensive AWS can hardly be framed 
104 
because AWS are not captured within the Jus ad Bellum moral theory, or the legitimacy of 
waging war; nor do AWS fall simply under the moral category of Jus in Bello.105 It is less 
 
, and He  
Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 7 (2006), 255-297, esp. 272-277. 
95 See the issues discussed by A. , 4 vols. (Jerusalem: 1995-2006); Z. Ben-
Shlomo,  Halakhah mimeqorah: Tsava, vol. 1 (Tel 
Aviv, 2010); R. Eyal Karim, , 4 vols. (Jerusalem: 
1999- www.daat.ac.il/daat/tsava/key. See Cohen, 
Divine Service, 118- -halakhah is worthy of thorough 
examination, considering Batnitzky, How Judaism Became a Religion, and the remark supra n.68. 
96 Since there is no halakhic work by them after 2006 (that I am aware of), it is perhaps exaggerated to look 
for an engagement with autonomous weapons, let alone AWS. Still, one could expect leading authorities of 
military halakhah to engage with the topic, as we indeed find in the articles included in . 
97 On war ethics in religious Zionist halakhic discourse, see E. Holzer, A Double-Edged Sword: Military 
Activism in the Thought of Religious Zionism [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: 2009). 
98 , 
Harvard Theological Review 87 (1994), 323-346. 
99 See M. Sot., chapter 8. 
100 As distinct from what can be 
attitudes  -
acknowledge the ethical role of normativity and lawfulness (or halakhah). Compar Theoretical 
The Journal of Religion 99:3 (2019), 312-340. 
101 See M. Sotah 8:6; M. Sanh. 1:5, 2:4, and their talmudic commentaries. Regarding the categories of 
Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot 
melakhim u-  [Laws of Kings and Wars], in The Book of Judges, A. Hershman (trans.) (New 
Haven, 1949), chapters 4-8 (13-27). 
102 Walzer is skeptical whether Jewish tradition may teach us moderns anything substantial about Just War 
theory. H
commanded/permitted does not translate into just/unjust, there is nothing in the Jewish tradition that requires, 
or even that provides a vocabulary for, a moral investiga
Law, Politics, and Morality in Judaism, 149-168, at 151 and 158 respectively). Ravitzky, 
is the foundation of Jewish law. 
103 -60. 
104 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. In 
Daedalus 145 (2016), 12-24, Walzer is indeed concerned that the new technological tools are creating the 
 
105 Looking to The 
Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Leiden, 2010), 931-950. 
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the morally legitimized military act, than the ethical legitimacy of its technological 
production. Put differently, it is not what makes someone a justified target for military 
attack, or the question of the proportionality of military force, but the moral agency of the 
combatant (which is robotic in the case of AWS). What we are interested in here is thus 
whether an artificial agent, a sophisticated AI-operated lethal machine, ought to be 
considered a worthy moral agent, and in what can be said about that from a Jewish ethical 
perspective. 
To my best knowledge, the only exception to the halakhic silence regarding AWS106 
 (which deals also with 
autonomous cars107 and other relevant topics). Nevins contends that regarding autonomous 
weapons systems, 
  
Human approval must be required for the use of force that will be lethal to other 
humans. This may require structures such as 24/7 human operators to authorize 
lethal defensive attacks, and humans must always be in control of preemptive uses 
of force. Jewish law is exceptionally cautious about the evidentiary standards 
required to justify killing a human. Autonomous weapon systems must not use 
lethal force without human direction.108 
 
-halakhic orientation is proximal to that of this article: Machines should 
not be granted the authority to kill absent of human supervision. Following the biblical 
principles and halakhic values presented above, we will now ask whether this is supported 
or even required by techno-ethics. 
 
3. Ethical Principles of Humane Techno-Ethics 
To reconstruct a halakhic approach to AWS, there is a need to clarify its ethical status, as 
technology. To do so, it is necessary to make explicit what I take to be three ethical 
premises of a humane techno-ethics, or a humane philosophy of technology: the relational 
character of ethics; technology is not completely neutral; the fallaciousness of 
transhumanism. These premises are, in my opinion, the basis for a consideration of new 
technologies in many other contexts in the civilian realm (digital media, smartphones, 
autonomous cars, etc.). In the present case, I define these premises as the ground for 
examining AWS halakhically. 
 
3.1. The Relational Character of Ethics 
 
106 Rabbi Michael Avraham goes as far as to endorse AWS with
2018, accessed at mikyab.net). Perhaps the above silence is because Israeli halakhic authorities tend to stretch 
the validity of halakhic concepts when it comes to the justification of Jewish self-defense (influenced by the 
bitter lesson of the Holocaust aside other reasons). As Y
by giving a broader (and at times problematic) interpretation to some halakhic sources, and by relying upon 
of Hostile Civilian Populations: The Contemporary Halakhic Discussion 
Israel Studies 1 [1996], 27-44, at 28). 
107 
justifiably exempting the ACD from possible damages. However, calling the vehicle-
implies that we expect from this person some degree of responsibility. Otherwise, such a halakhic question 
is like asking about the liability of a bus passenger in an accident caused by the bus driver. One could think 
that a VL will be expected, e.g. to be highly cautious when the AC rides in populated areas and to be attentive 
for emergency stop or slowing down the AC if it seems to go faster than reasonable in such populated areas. 
If Jewish law is not demanding this kind of (or moral perfectionating) from the VL, or civil 
Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal The Harvard Law 
Review 106 (1993), 813, 894. 
108  
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- s who believe that ethics is 
algorithmizable,109 I follow algorithm or 
mechanical procedure, no set of fixed 
lead us to the truth in every field, or in any, bu
110 Fallibilistic ethical orientation thus 
rejects the very attempt of algorithmizing ethics. This is crucial for clarifying why ascribing 
ethical agency to AI-operated robots is problematic. Hard ethical questions involve the use 
of human imaginative faculties111 (as we shall see below in section 5, when exploring the 
ethical- faculties are 
not rationally exhaustible. 
The dominant Cartesian conceptualization of the human ignores both material and 
emotional aspects of subjectivity,112 and portrays the human as cogito deprived of 
corporeality, and thus gives rise to an algorithmic account of ethics.113 This, to my mind, 
is a main reason why many people do not consider AWS an ethical problem at all. Instead 
of this Cartesian (and to some extent Kantian) conception of the human as cogito, which 
provide a one-sided account of what is the humane, I assume that ethics is understood as: 
(i) Relational114 or dialogical: In accordance with the attitudes of Martin Buber,115 
Emmanuel Levinas,116 Carol Gilligan,117 Steven Darwall,118 and others, and in opposition 
to the dominant legacy of hyper individualistic Western attitudes, namely that of Descartes, 
Kierkegaard, and the French Existentialists (chiefly Camus and Sartre).119 In the Jewish-
halakhic context, Leora Batnitzky and Suzanne Last Stone have critically acknowledged 
the special place of the feminine relationality in Jewish tradition,120 and its role in halakhic 
 
109 IEEE Intelligent Systems 21 (2004), 46-51. 
That paper attempts to prov . A proximate paradigm is found at times 
even when AI- -u  deductive 
top-down rule-based morality. See e.g. Wallach and Allen, Moral Machines, especially chapters 2-4 (25-72). 
110 J. Conant (ed.), Words and Life  
111 See M. Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (Chicago, 1993), and 
the references he provides. In an age when technological capabilities often exceed our imagination, political 
and moral imagination should be taken even more seriously.  
112 See René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. J. Cottingham (Cambridge, 1996), mainly 
the first two meditations (1-23). For a critique of Cartesian anthropology, see H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of 
Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology (Evanston, Illinois: 2001), 58-63; D. Leder, The Absent Body 
(Chicago, 1990); G. Lloyd,  (London, 
1984). 
113 Compa -based account of morality is arguably wedded to a 
masculine account of the human. See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, 1983). 
114 idem (eds.), 
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (Oxford, 2000), 3-
31. 
115 I and Thou, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York, 1970); idem, Between Man and Man, trans. R. Gregor Smith 
(London, 1947). 
116 See for example his Ethics and Infinity, R. Cohen (trans.) (Pittsburgh, 1985). 
117 In a Different Voice and elsewhere) is distinctively different from Donna 
- ocialist-Feminism in the late 
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: 1991), 149-181. 
For a critique of post-humanism, see section 3.3. below. 
118 See his The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, 2006). 
119 otes 124-
Between Man and Man, 46-97. For a critique of the European 
existentialist approach, promoting estrangem -human environment, see H. 
Jonas, The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity (Boston, 
2001), 320-340.  
120 structions of the 
Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy (Bloomington, 2004), 127-
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tradition121 (without excluding the dialectic significance of the masculine).122 It is also vital 
to note that relationality does not embrace only the positive type of transactions. It includes 
the possibility of human engagement in punishing an individual or a collective for their 
aggression, or simply, a responsive self-defense.123 
(ii) Pragmatic: Instead of the dualistic Cartesian model on its prototypical linear 
reasoning,124 humane techno-ethics endorses a holistic body-mind dependence,125 and 
correspondingly to that, acknowledges the holistic mutual-dependence of different 
explanatory factors (as distinguished from Cartesian linear foundationalism). This 
pragmatism overlaps the above relationality in important ways.126 
(iii) Involving metaphysical commitments and pragmatically drawing on traditional 
wisdom.127 - cs (or philosophy), 
indispensable factor: Halakhah and aggadah are entangled, mutually supportive, and 
inexhaustible.128 
Those three ethical traits (relationality, pragmatism, and metaphysicality), to my 
best judgment, are in accordance with the ethical sensitivities found in NLJT.129 
 
152. On relational care in modern Jewish thought, compare M.H. Benjamin, The Obligated Self: Maternal 
Subjectivity and Jewish Thought (Bloomington: 2018). While rejecting a straightforward identification 
between Judaism (or ethics) and feminism, these authors claim that care ethics is indispensable for any 
sustainable moral philosophy. 
121 
Indiana Law Journal 67 (1992) 915, 949; S. Las
Women in Jewish Philosophy, 263-288. It is noteworthy to mention that 
such intuition about the role of care ethics as feminine-
argument that there are no differences at all (both descriptive and prescriptive), at the large numbers, between 
males and females. Compare Gilligan, Different Voice.  
122 Human beings, and their mentalities, are not homogenous entities: men may have various sorts of 
femininity, and the opposite. The problem with erasing every difference between the sexes, by the radical 
nominalist conceptualization of gender, is that the ground for acknowledging the above richness is removed, 
in favor of a duplicative concept of the human beings. Striving for equality and criticizing some damages of 
the patriarchal family structures are in place, but it does not require a supersessionist methodology. Compare 
Religion: Beyond a Concept (New 
York, 2008), 491-512. On erasing the differences between men and women as dehumanizing, see E. Fromm, 
The Art of Loving (New York, 1956), 14-16.  
123 fellow human beings or God my response will 
not be primarily thinking but action (though this involves thinking), and the action may be one of love, 
responsi
indeed, also Hitler was Phenomenon of Life, 285). 
124 tshorne and P. Weiss 
(eds.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5 (Cambridge, 1935), paragraphs 264-317. 
125 See for instance, J. Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, 1925). For a formulation of such a 
pragmatic and integrative body-mind approach in the context of Jewish law, see E. Berkovits, God, Man and 
History: A Jewish Interpretation (New York, 1959); N. Rako A 
Jewish Law Annual 19 (2011), 83-88. 
126 
(ed.), Martin Buber and the Human Sciences (Albany, 1996), 33-50. 
127 As in A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Bloomington, 1984). Compare with my article 
(under review) -laden Jewish Tradition . 
128 See supra n.75. Excellent demonstrations for this entanglement of law and narrative are made by M. 
Halbertal, Interpretative Revolutions in the Making: Values as Interpretative Considerations in Midrashei 
Halakhah [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 1997).  
129 On the dialogical and interpersonal emphasis in the Hebrew Bible, see M. Buber, Two Types of Faith, 
N.P. Goldhawk (trans.) (New York, 1951). On the role of pragmatism (and metaphysics) in Jewish tradition, 
compare N.S. 
Perspectives on Hayyim Hirschensohn, Mordecai M. Kaplan an
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2018). 
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3.2. Technology is not completely Neutral 
In a clear sense, technology is neutral, as people often argue in the knife example: 
the decision of its usage is in human hands (or minds). However, technology is not 
completely t 
technology is a neutral means that lacks any internal directivity or character.130 Call it the 
The humane techno-ethical theorists Hans Jonas, Erich Fromm, Jacques Ellul, Langdon 
Wiener, Sherry Turkle,131 and others have argued in various contexts that there are, indeed, 
some inherent premises and trajectories in technological culture in general, and in specific 
technologies. Nowadays, the critique of algorithmic discrimination is everywhere in the 
legal studies of techno-culture.132 
133 By the end of the 1970s, the term technique  has been used to denote what we 
osition about the redundancy of 
objects is surprisingly championed in a world that is otherwise often perceived in modern 
eyes as totally disenchanted of any logos or teleology (including ethical) that it formerly 
conceived to have had.134 Against this background, one may question the popular term 
135 if humans are fallible, and by no means inherently good,136 it 
Further questions 
apply to the enthusiasm surrounding AI, which often seems to be over-estimated and even 
deified.137 The admiration of data and metrics138 as such is not a new phenomenon, but the 
advancements of AI have managed to attract expectations, up to a kind of machine-
worship.139 Yuval Noah Harari has (ironically but soberly) named this cultural inclination 
 
130 From Max Weber, H.H. Gerth 
and C.W. Mills (trans. and ed.) (New York, 1946), 129-156. For a critical engagement with the concept of 
Ritual and Secular History in Nineteenth- UC Irvine Law Review 1 (2011) 813, 842. 
131 See correspondingly in their works: Jonas, Philosophical Essays, Part One (3-182); Fromm, The 
Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology (New York, 1968); Ellul, The Technological Society, 
J. Wilkinson (trans.) (New York, 1964); Wiener, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age 
of High Technology (Chicago, 1986); Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age 
(New York, 2015). 
132 One of the leading voices Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality 
and Threatens Democracy (New York, 2016), which examines algorithmic judgments in various life-aspects: 
applying to college, to work, landing credit, getting insurance, and so on. 
133 On the distinctions and the entanglements of these terms, see comprehensively in E. Schatzberg, 
Technology: Critical History of a Concept (Chicago, 2018). 
134 hantment, 
in this sense), even within  Sacred Canopy (and supra 
n.39). On present-day scientism and reduction, see R. Tallis, Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis, and 
the Misrepresentation of Humanity (Durham, UK, 2011), esp. 15-50. 
135 Wallach and Allen, Moral Machines; Verbeek, Moralizing Technology; and many others. These verbal 
 
136 In Gen. 1, God is not de s all the other creatures are explicitly 
worldview. 
137 Social Science Research 
Network (Nov 27, 2017). Sober doubts about the viability of AI technologies in the foreseen future were 
Aeon 
(May 31, 2019, available online); see her Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans (New York, 
2019). 
138 Compare J.Z. Muller, The Tyranny of Metrics (Princeton, 2018). 
139 
hear adults and adolesc
well-tested algorithm. When we treat people
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140 Well, even if something is well programmed, 141 this 
does not make it into a person, or into a moral agent or independent moral entity.  
In line with the above humanistic scholars (Jonas, Turkle, et al.), and in contrast to 
Martin Heidegger,142 I argue that the question of technology is primarily ethical. The 
sensitivity to normative contexts and commitments is what distinguishes humanistic 
scholars like Jonas and Levinas.143 The problem with the TNT is that it ignores the vast 
potential for ethical degradation in moder
critique of the fertile ground that modern nihilism and viciousness found in the blind 
worship of technique.144 Our present discussion, therefore, emphasizes the role of ethics in 
the halakhic examination of technology. This is important to emphasize, because halakhic 
authors often underestimate the fundamental nihilism which prevails in transhumanism, a 
technological worldview I will shortly present and criticize. 
 
3.3. The Fallaciousness of Transhumanism 
The debate about AWS does not occur in an intellectual vacuum. In recent decades, 
various post-modernist ideologies reject the traditional ideas and ideals of humanism. Two 
main branches are Post-humanism and Transhumanism. The former argues that human 
supremacy should be replaced by a more fluid and horizontal-egalitarian relations of 
humans and their surroundings.145 Whereas post-humanistic authors are less decisive about 
the unworth of humans, and concentrate more on countering the Cartesian image of 
humanity, transhumanists have a strictly negative appreciation of the human creature.146 
Transhumanists, such as the technology-leader Ray Kurzweil, academic scholars like Nick 
Bostrom,147 and others (e.g. Max More) claim, based on evolutional argumentation, that 
 
advice becomes the gold standard, we learn not to feel safe with fal Reclaiming Conversation, 
 
140 Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York, 2017), 372-402. In Hebrew we may term this 
process as  (paraphrasing the coin ). In the Bible, however, the noun dat in the book of Esther is 
used to ridicule the idea of immutable dictate, which is as the same time contingent upon the drunkenness of 
the ruler. 
141 olish, the most deluded, the most shortsighted enterprises let 
alone the most wicked  farsighted as to the 
distance of the intended goal are children of the concepts of the day, of what at the moment is taken for 
(Philosophical Essays, 175).  
142 See his The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. W. Lovitt (New York, 1977), 3-
35. On Hei  Gnostic Religion, 320-340. On 
Emmanuel Levinas as inherently different from Heidegger in prioritiz
and Ethics: Questioning First Philosophy in Levinas, Heidegge
(Pittsburgh, 2008 , 178-186.  
143 Undermining this profound difference, e.g. by D. Gunkel, The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives 
on AI, Robots, and Ethics (Cambridge, 2012), chapter 3, is problematic, to say the least. For a proper reading 
and M. Calarco (eds.), Radicalizing Levinas (Albany, 2010), 153-167. 
144 See Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, 2001), 1-30. 
145  
146 
Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: D Existenz 8:2 (2013), 26-
32. I thank Carmel Weisman for the reference to this article. 
147 Journal of Evolution and Technology 14 (2005), 1-25; 
idem, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford, 2014). 
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humanity is about to end its evolutional role on earth.148 Some authors, like Eric Dietrich,149 
even contend that the extinction of humanity is something we should positively promote.150 
A significant tail- -na
Benatar,151 who argues that human life is mainly misery and thus it would be best to avoid 
the human burden of coming into existence.152 In addition, the futuristic promises 
transhumanism makes about the feasible and ethical prospects of technologies (AWS in 
this case), are arguably undermining the pragmatic ethical discussion that can guide the 
public discourse.153 
The crucial question about the anti-human biases of Transhumanism, or its 
154 is, ultimately: Is there any value in the human, or the humane, that makes 
living worthwhile? 
more we deal with contemporary and macro issues in bioethics, the more we realize that 
y a matter of our ultimate hopes and fears, of 
155 A negative 
response to the question about the merit of life, or whether humans are of any essential 
worth, thus influences the Transhumanist approach toward AWS.  
Halakhic commitments may accord incidentally with post-humanism156 (and much 
less with transhumanism). True, both normative Judaism and post-humanism reject 
Cartesian anthropology, but they do so in favor of different purposes. The anthropology of 
the main voices of talmudic writings differs from Cartesian anthropology157 in opposing 
the Cartesian 
rather than accepting the controversial Cartesian anthropology of the human and lamenting 
 
148 See R. Kurzweil, Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York, 2006), who predicts 
(1- -  and 
take over the world, 
phraseology seems apocalyptic, as he divides history into distinct and determinate eras, after which the 
a critique of Singularitarianism as dogmatic, see P. Ochs, 
California, on Feb. 23, 2018). I thank Ochs for sharing with me this profound paper.  
149 apiens 2.0: Building the 
(eds.), Machine Ethics (New York, 2011), 531-538. Dietrich is presenting humans as charged with 
immoralities such as racism, rape, murder, and child abuse. He infers that we had better build robotic 
  
150 
The Future of Mankind, E.B. Ashton (trans.) [Chicago, 1961], 230). 
151 Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence 
South African Journal of 
Philosophy 31 (2012), 69-78. 
152 Benatar (Better Never, 222-223) baraita in Erub. 13b 
( ). However, Benatar does not seem to share with the halakhic school of 
Shammai a normative life-oriented commitment. 
153 See R.L.A. Jones, Against Transhumanism: The Delusion of Technological Transcendence (2016, 
available at his website, softmachines.org), 36. 
154 
Hauskeller, Mythologies of Transhumanism (Cham, Switzerland, 2016), esp.11-34.  
155 Matters of Life and Death: A Jewish Approach to Medical Ethics (Philadelphia, 1998), 395. 
156 See e.g. M.B. Wasserman, Jews, Gentiles and Other Animals: The Talmud After the Humanities 
(Philadelphia, 2017), 166-212. Wasserman is analyzing A.Zar. in the Bavli against the post-humanist 
worldview. However, the difficulty with post- -
is its insufficient distinction (namely, objects). 
If the compassion toward a suffering animal is not clearly distinguished from sympathy to physical items, it 
the practice of empathy (toward the physical and the artificial world, in the present case), regardless of its 
costs,  
157 Compare I. Rosen- Journal of Jewish Studies 
66:1 (2015), 36-58, at 54. 
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-humanism,158 talmudic and halakhic writings may be a 
vital source for amending the dominant dualist Cartesian paradigm, into a more 
environment-friendly one.159  
Another contemporary transhumanist challenge is the narrow-naturalistic and 
reductionist perspective of the Sapiens: A 
Brief History of Humankind.160 This approach is problematic, since any ethical account of 
moral dilemmas must be evaluated by some ethical principles. Absent of pragmatic-
metaphysical grounds, strict naturalism can hardly climb from the naturalistic descriptive 
to the ethically prescriptive.161 By that I do not intend to reject naturalism altogether. I 
rather follow Hans Jonas and 162 and reject the 
presupposition that empirical data is all there is.163 
 
3.3.1. Idolatry Prohibition as a Humanistic Critique 
One of the powerful humanistic mechanisms that Jewish tradition (including Jewish 
law) has provided to humanity is the prohibition and critique of idolatry (Exod. 20:3-5).164 
Conceptually, this theological-religious transgression is the fallacy of making of means 
into ends.165 As Martin Buber famously stated, the devastating effects of industrial 
the means into an 
end:  
 
Man is no longer able to master the world which he himself brought about: it is 
becoming stronger th
the word which could subdue and render harmless the golem he has cre
Machines, which were invented in order to serve men in their work, impressed him 
into their service. They were no l
man became their extension, an adjunct on their periphery, doing their bidding.166 
 
Admittedly, from a pragmatic point of view, means and ends are to some extent 
entangled.167 That is not to say, however, that there are no distinctions between means and 
ends, or that human beings may be treated as mere objects.168 
 
158  Talmud after the Humanities. 
159 As in Jonas, Responsibility. 
160 New York, 2015. 
161 True, Harari (and other naturalist atheists) is raising ethical concerns about technological disruptions. One 
could expect to find a reference in his books to Hans Jonas, an important (if not the most important) 
contributor to the philosophical articulation of techno-ethical concerns. However, I did not find any reference 
Gnostic Religion) may nevertheless shed 
light on the polar  in his book Sapiens and his spiritualized 
singularitarianism in his later book Homo-Deus.  
162 See Jonas, Phenomenon of Life; L. Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs 
(New York, 1985). 
163 See W.V.O. Q  Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20-43. Quine 
objected to reductionist empiricism, in favor of a holistic pragmatism. 
164 For a comprehensive philosophical exploration of the topic, see M. Halbertal and A. Margalit, Idolatry, 
trans. N. Goldblum (Cambridge, 1992). 
165 Ends that 
Justify the Means [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 2000). However, a crucial question is whether the means are 
promoting a worthy end. See more below n.188. 
166 Buber, Between Man and Man, 187. 
167 See H. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other Essays (Cambridge, 2002). 
168 A radical example for that in the context of war ethics, was provided by Paul Ramsey in his thought-
no one was killed or maimed on the highways; and that the reason for the remarkable restraint placed on the 
recklessness of automobile drivers was that suddenly every one of them discovered he was driving with a 
 (The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility [New York, 1968], 171, 
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Transhumanism often seems to succumb into an idolatrous urge. A bold example 
169 While in his former book, 
Sapiens,170 human beings are mere incidental organisms (not inherently different from a 
tomato or a dog), the next book 
 the religious inclination 
to divinize objects, into a kind of idolatrous urge, is intellectually enabled by what Peter 
Berger 
all there is.171 It turns out that idolatry is still present in the modern world, but the socio-
intellectual discourse of it,172 and thus the normative imperative to criticize it (namely, 
idolatry prohibition), is seldom acknowledged.173  
Idolatry-prohibition, or iconoclasm of a moderate type, is vital for a moral critique 
because one of the most powerful AWS artifacts is the human-like killer-robot. While 
many people feel that there is a sense of dehumanization reflected in this specific kind of 
AWS (namely, a humanoid killer), it is hard if not impossible to criticize it on narrow 
naturalistic grounds (on AWS and idolatry, see more in section 6.3 below). Normative-
laden Jewish tradition, to its branches, rather endorses the profound humanistic value-
concept of createdness in the image of God,174 which stands in contrast to the post-human 
(let alone transhuman) attempt to deny any metaphysical redundancy of humans as 
compared to objects. Halakhic orientations rather posit, based on awareness of the 
prohibition of idolatry, that the kind of continuum that exists between humans and animals 
as living creatures is not found between humans and physical non-living objects.175 
To sum up section 3, the ethical premises of humane techno-ethics are relational-
pragmatic, reject the TNT paradigm, and keep an open eye on the fetishism of deifying 
things. To my best understanding, these are also dominant ethical strands found in NLJT. 
Equipped with these intellectual sensitivities, we turn now to the question regarding the 
ethicality of AWS. This exploration will lead us, in its turn, to Jewish law and ethics in 
section 5 onward. 
 
4. The Ethics of AWS 
Up until two decades ago, the public consensus was that the very possibility of 
AWS is inherently problematic. This is exemplified by the rules penned by the renowned 
writer on robotics, Isaac Asimov. His famous basic laws of robotics are: 
2) 
 
cited in Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 270). This observation is affirmed by Leo Strauss, who contended 
Thoughts on Machiavelli [Chicago, 
1958], 234). 
169  
170 Sapiens. Here the English title is rather vulgarizing the original Hebrew title ( ). 
171 See supra n.39.  
172 A telling example is that surprisingly, the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not have an 
entry on idolatry.  
173 Following Jonas, Jonathan Cahana has aptly argued that since the modern world has become by large 
 See 
Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 86 (2018), 158-180, at 169. It seems improbable, for several reasons, to accept 
endorsed Gnosticism, mainly since he dedicated his entire mature academic 
career to defend the natural world (which is a mere cosmic accident, from a gnostic perspective). Compare 
Wiese, Jonas, 87- -Gnosticism:  
(forthcoming). 
174 See supra n.42.  
175 that subjectivity can be identified with rationality and therefor 
(Jonas, Responsibility, 62). 




176 From the perspective of the 
present era, it seems that Asimov was naïve, or unaware of many relevant tech-disruptions 
and ethical dilemmas.177 Robots are technological tools. As such, they would be used, and 
in fact are already being used, in warfare, even if not yet fully autonomous. As AWS 
exemplify, some robots can exist for the sole function of killing. Thus, we have to consider 
the topic critically and without transhumanist (or other) techno-enthusiasm. 
The main practical demands on the creators of AI-operated (ro)bots are safety, both 
in terms of their beneficial functioning and their non-hackability, making them secure from 
malicious hostile takeover. In terms of values, the main requirements are accountability 
(who is responsible for this robot and in which ways?178), transparency, and 
consequentially explainability:179 Does the technological system reflect and accord with 
comprehend in which way this artificial object acts in accordance with coherent and 
distinguishable ethical judgment. Let us examine these parameters in the case of AWS. 
 
4.1. AWS Proponents: efficiency and higher precision 
The discussion about AWS is part of a wider controversy regarding the morality of 
robots. Luciano Floridi and Jeff W. Sanders180 and Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh 
Anderson,181 initially consider robots as having an independent moral status and certain 
moral agency. In this group, some advocate the use of UAV but not AWS.182 However, a 
positive attitude towards UAV provides fertile ground for developing and using AWS. For 
example, Ronald C. Arkin,183 and Charles J. Dunlap,184 are two of the most explicit 
supporters of AWS. According to them, creating and using AWS is not only legitimate but, 
in fact mandatory, to reduce unnecessary casualties of soldiers and to diminish collateral 
damage to uninvolved civilians. The main consideration here is utilitarian efficiency, 
encapsulated in the Principle of Unnecessary Risk (PUR).185 By significantly reducing 
friendly-fire casualties and making the use of deadly force more precise, they intend to 
make warfare more ethical. The removal of humans from the battlefield is seemingly good 
news, especially for those who (happen to) win.  
The optimism of the AWS supporters seems unfounded. Even scholars who are 
positive about creating an AMA, concede that e can rely on the care of our own 
 
176 Asimov, I, Robot [1950] (Greenwich, CT, 1970), 40. On the contradictions between the three laws, see 
ibid., 41. 
177 And not of the rise of post-
nd Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of 
Ohio State Law Journal 16 (2017), 1217,  . 
178 Science and Engineering Ethics 2 (1996), 
25-42. 
179 This problem was addressed by the E GDPR) of 
2016. 
180 Minds and Machines 14 (2004), 349-379. Their conclusion is 
established by lowering the threshold of moral requirement for non-human entities. 
181 Machine Ethics: Creating an Ethic AI Magazine 28 (2007), 15-26. 
182 -
, in S. Lazar and H. Frowe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War (Oxford, 2018), 472-
487. Rather than a straightforward defense of AWS, Statman aims to falsify the common arguments 
concerning its immorality.  
183 Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (Boca Raton, FL, 2009). 
184  Temple International & 
Comparative Law Journal 30 (2016), 63, 76. 
instead to create productive legal tools to regulate AWS on the international level. 
185  
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military in the deployment of robotic weapons, we have no basis for assuming other parties 
will demonstrate simila 186 It is not clear what will maintain basic moral borderlines 
in warfare inhabited by AWS or prevent them from violating basic humanitarian standards, 
after the AWS will move from the battlefield to conquer the civilian homeland. In this sense, 
the common te -
scale civilian catastrophes will be avoided in a situation where no person is held responsible 
and accountable.187  
Furthermore, the PUR does not provide a clear answer to the problem of ethical 
end justifies al 188 
moral restrictions still apply. As Paul W. Kahn has noted,189 the very license to kill in a 
war let alone the ethical guidelines of warfare is premised on the mutuality of being a 
-combatant home-
front (orref) civilians are becoming a de-facto-
(human and other). Given that the primary role of the army is to protect its citizens, such a 
constellation is inherently problematic, and even antinomian. 
 
4.2. Against AWS: moral entities, not moral agents 
Beyond the acute practical-ethical issues of safety from hostile attack,190 there are 
fundamental ethical problems with AWS. In lines that broadly parallel or complement a 
range of other scholars who have written on AWS including Noel Sharkey,191 Armin 
Krishnan,192 Jürgen Altmann,193 Peter M. Asaro,194 Robert Sparrow,195 Jason 
Borenstein,196 Eliav Lieblich and Eyal Benvenisti,197 Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni,198 
 
186 W. Wallach and C. Allen, Ethics Information Technology 15 (2013), 
125-135. gree to forego the development of 
autonomous lethal weaponry, autonomy will need to become a consideration in all future arms control 
ibid., 135). 
187 Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2007), 62-77. 
188 This principle is not used straightforwardly in Jewish war ethics. See, e.g., 
9 (1988), 231-240. In a non-military context, Rakover, Ends 
that Justify the Means, concentrates on legitimizing halakhic means that advance the goals of peace and 
reconc
War and Peace in Rabbinic Judaism [Lanham, 




190 Given the advanced military cyber and nano-technologies, many components and procedures are likely to 
go out of control during war (at least f -ordinated 
first attack could destroy many opponent UVs, shooting could start on any indication of attack, including 
Ethics 
Information Technology 15 [2013], 137-152, at 141). 
191 Journal of Military Ethics 9 (2010), 369-383. 





196 Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2 (2008), 1-17. 
newest and latest tec  
197  
198 Happiness is the Wrong Metric: A Liberal 
Communitarian Response to Populism (Cham, Switzerland, 2018), 253-263. 
Berman: Jewish Law, Techno-Ethics, and AWS 113 
 
 
Deborah G. Johnson,199 Keith W. Miller,200 and Ryan Tonkens201 I argue that the most 
fundamental question is whether ethics is exhaustively formalizable, and hence 
algorithmizable, and computable. As argued above (section 3.1), I do not think the answer 
is affirmative.202 Ethics is by its nature fallible, dialogical, and inter-human.203 Thus 
removing human discretion from the battlefield seems morally unjustified.204 I will now 
elaborate. 
 
4.3. Does the Functional exhaust the Human? 
The question concerning the computability of ethics depends to some extent upon 
whether the human mind 
duplicate or reflect human ethical mental deliberations. However, scholars such as John 
Searle,205 David Chalmers,206 Hubert C. Dreyfus,207 Drew McDermott,208 Raymond 
Tallis,209 Uri Maoz et al,210 and Yochai Ataria,211 have provided solid arguments against 
the idea of the computability of human consciousness, or the mind (we should also recall 
that if H
reasons to believe that the animal kin
and other computational manipulations may influence the human mind  from brain-
computer interfaces to digital media  is 
different issue.  
Thus, as McDermott pointed out explicitly in discussing robotics, an AI operated 
robot cannot be a moral agent insofar it has no personal subjectivity will, interests, desires, 
and the ability to sense oneself reflectively as having a body.212 The fact that we attribute 
 
199  Ethics Information Technology 8 (2006), 195-
205. 
200 D.G. Johns - Ethics Information Technology 10 
(2008), 123-133. 
201 Journal of Military Ethics 11 (2012), 149-
168. 
202 In a similar way, Guy Kahane contends in his article Sidetracked by Trolleys: Why Sacrificial Moral 
Social Neuroscience 10:5 (2015), 551-
 is 
 True, many 
routine matters of inter-human interactions (such as in a commercial context) are more easily formalizable 
in binary schemes, and hence do not violate ethical norms. However, matters of life and death are qualitatively 




syntactic and not semantical, and thus inferior to rational human beings, appeared in his 
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), 417-457. Searle holds it as valid up to this very 
day. 
206 Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995), 200-219. 
207  (Cambridge, 1993). 
208 Machine Ethics, 88-114. McDe
things, some very urgently, and our desires often overwhelm our principles, or threaten to. For a robot to 
-  
209 Aping Mankind, chapter 3, -146). 
210 U. Maoz, L. Mudrik, R. Rivlin, I. Ross, and A. Ma
Surrounding Free Will: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience (New York, 
2015), 184-  
1980s), the authors cast doubts on the deterministic conclusions that some scholars derived from these 
experiments. 
211 Not in Our Brain: Consciousness, Body, World (Jerusalem, 2019).  
212 -112. Sherry Turkle compellingly explained why this 
specific character is so appealing to beings who have 
they [robots] will provide Turkle, 
Conversation, 352). 
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personality to software and robots makes many people believe that they are independent 
agents.213 In a legal context, Jack M. Balkin term
is making it 
work who has good intentions or bad intentions, and who makes the program do good or 
214 
To state the uniqueness of humans through a different lens, foundational to Jewish 
law: C the entrance gate to the Bible (Gen. 1:27). This is in 
contrast to the Cartesian (and to some extent, Maimonidean) definition of humans as 
characterized by ratio, or the cognitive faculty.215 According to the definition of the 
AI-operated silicon artifacts may perhaps eventually acquire some sort of humaneity.216 
The biblical understanding of the human, however, seems richer. It is holistic about body-
mind relations, and includes the corporeal.217 This attitude is manifested in the rabbinic 
interpretations of imago-Dei, as Yair Lorberbaum has demonstrated in detail.218 In contrast 
to Gnostic thinkers such as Marcion, in the second century CE, and contemporary 
transhumanist thinkers such as Ray Kurzweil,219 the human body in classical Judaism is 
neither a mere shell, nor a cosmological accident.220 This observation bears tremendous 
consequences for the discussion of machine ethics. If humans are grounded in a body and 
cognitively influenced by it, as many pragmatic philosophers have demonstrated,221 then it 
is unclear what is significantly human (or humane) in a piece of plastic, sophisticated and 
AI operated as it may be. 
To spell this out further, the glorification of AI and of software as a kind of 
spiritualized hypostasis222 
 
213 On the fallacy of personifying a thing as if it was human, see Jonas, Responsibility, 67, 229.  
214 tive and projective as this fallacy is, it makes some 
ithmic 
U.C. Davis Law Review 51 
(2018), 1149-1210, at 1159. I thank my student Coby Simler for making me fully aware of the moral severity 
of the topic of robotic speech. 
215 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. S. Pines, vol.1 (Chicago, 1963), ch.1 (21-23). Maimonides 
was not utterly wrong, but too narrow about defining the humane. However, the picture shifts significantly 
 context, e.g. in Shmonah Praqim. See D.H. Frank, 
Cohen and H. Levine (eds.), Maimonides and the Sciences (Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2000), 25-33. 
216 See e.g. R. Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New 
York, 2000).  
217 Guide. Cf. Berkovits, God, Man, and History
cal anthropology, which is not rational-idealist but 
integrative. 
218 Lorberbaum,  
219 On the profound connections between late antiquity Gnosis and modern Existentialism, see Jonas, Gnostic 
Religion, 31-47, 320-
the Corporeal Battle: How Second-
Mercer and T.J. Trothen (eds.), Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement 
(Santa Barbara, 2015), 273-
task in being a safeguard for Christianity against this destructive temptation, see B. Pollock, Franz 
 Conversions: World Denial and World Redemption (Bloomington, 2014 . 
220 This is common to both creation narratives in Gen. 1-2. See J.B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith 
[1965] (New Milford, 2012). 
221 See, e.g., G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York, 1999). This direction continues the philosophical route of the classical 
turn, corresponds to the 
embeddedness found in normative-laden Jewish tradition, see Boyarin, Carnal Israel. 
222 Compare supra n.133, regarding the 20th  
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and autonomy as the conditions for moral agency.223 While these conditions are ethically 
important, they disregard the material dimension in human life. Here arises an interesting 
paradox. It seems that an important obstacle for robots to have and display consciousness 
and ethical agency is that, in contrast to humans, robots have no body.224 To be considered 
a moral agent, having a body is no less important than intentionality.225 It is by the body 
226 It is the body that makes us 
vulnerable and at the same time punishable. Disembodiment is thus an (or the) obstacle for 
robots to have consciousness and ethical agency. Even if the digital media-platforms 
s, robots in contrast to humans will 
never have a sense of body, of embeddedness, and of experiencing finitude and 
loneliness.227  
This dependence of morality on materiality and mortality is critical even though it 
is neglected in the discussion about robot ethics.228 Instead of walking pragmatically on the 
narrow bridge of sustaining human-fallible ethical decision-making,229 
approach in techno-
relationality, through what we term 
dependence of morality upon materiality and mortality is nevertheless prevalent in 
NLJT,230 and led many to criticize it as being fallible (or somehow feminine).231 
 
Sword -Halakhic Perspectives on Moral Agency 
The theoretical disputes about the morality of AWS, as revisited above, are not 
enough to conceive the high socio-ethical stakes of AWS. We take it for granted nowadays 
that we constantly see human beings, talk to them, and often care about them. But that 
might change radically if human agency and interpersonal trust are fully replaced with 
mediating machines, and if we will ignore the inherent quest of many political rulers to 
bypass human dependency upon it.232 
To appreciate these stakes properly, there is a need to reclaim the scope of halakhic 
reasoning to include the faculty of moral imagination,233 which is a profound aggadic 
implement.234 Put differently, narratives may help figure out profound ethical implications 
 
223 See I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.) (Cambridge, 2002). 
224 Compare with section 3.1 above. 
225 Embodiment, and its loss, charge mental prices. See Ataria, Not in Our Brain, chapters 3-5. 
226 Morality and Mortality: A Search for the 
Good After Auschwitz, L. Vogel (ed.) (Evanston, Illinois, 1996), 87-98. The above intuition is held by F.M. 
Kamm, in her Morality, Mortality, Vol. I: Death and Whom to Save From It (Oxford, 1998). 
227 Compare T. Persic Alaxon (July 8, 2014, available 
online). In most cases, though, he manifests minimal ethical criticality about these opportunities. 
228 Probably due to the dominance of an absolutist Cartesian approach in Western philosophy (see supra 
n.112). 
229 This kind of corrigibilism is what M.J. Sandel (among others) is advocating in his The Case Against 
Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (Cambridge, 2007). For a halakhic perspective on the 
attempt to reduce the moral gap between the actual and the ideal, see Berkovits, Not in Heaven. 
230 But, of course, not exclusive to it.  
231 
narratological fact that biblical prophets like Abraham and Moses performed sins, brought Islamic scholars 
-Yafeh, Intertwined Worlds: Medieval Islam and Bible Criticism (Princeton, 1992), 
19-49. Another example is the Christian denigration of Jewish liturgical melodies as messy and uncultivated. 
See R. HaCohen, The Music Libel against the Jews (New Haven, 2011), especially 1-16, 126-178. 
232 See the concerns made by J. Susskind Future Politics: Living 
Together in a World Transformed by Tech (Oxford, 2018), 163-210. 
233 See Johnson, Moral Imagination. In accordance with the premises of the present article (see above section 
3.1), Johnson is a pragmatist thinker. 
234 See e.g. M. Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading 
(Bloomington, 1985), 41-57. 
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that would otherwise be latent. This can be illustrated regarding AWS through two stories 
in the biblical book of Samuel, (1) the killing of the priests of Nob by King Saul, and (2) 
the killing of Uriah the Hittite by King David. These cases shed light on the dangers of 
dehumanization in the public-political sphere, a risk that AWS might intensify. 
 
5.1. Bypassing Agency and the Moral Significance of Conscientious Objection 
In the first case, of the killing of the priests of Nob (1 Sam. 22), King Saul is 
presented as a paranoid ruler who suspects everyone. He orders his immediate guardians 
to kill A imelekh and the priests, but they refuse.235 
236 a concept acknowledged by halakhah.237 Saul, however, finds an alternative
thnically liminal figure (his name testifies for his 
holiness as binding him religiously, and to 
kill the priests of Nob manifests the complex nature of delegation in Jewish law (that is not 
to argue that the talmudic conceptualization of delegation has existed in such a legal form 
in biblical times).238 It manifests the critical role played by the messenger/executor himself 
(in talmudic words,  lidvar averah239). The messenger carries a direct 
responsibility, not only the sender.240 The problem in the case of AWS, however, is that 
there is no dist e many 
241
cannot be clearly assigned to any specific person or moral entity.242 Using a term taken 
from M. Taan. (3:5, makah mehalakhet), referring explicitly to the threat of the sword, 
punish a robot243 (in any foreseen future), since it has no personality and no embodied 
subjectivity.244 
 important features of a 
moral that is an illegal command and I will 
 
235 1 Sam. 22:17. 
236 See J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford, 1979), chapters 14-15 (262-289). 
237 -Halakhim as Moral Foundations: Philosophical and 
 Values as Tested in War (Jerusalem, 1985), 13-
oldstein,  [Hebrew] 
(Tel Aviv, 2013), 89-111. More generally, the idea of consent is basic to Jewish law. Forcing a person to sign 
a contract, for example, is exempting them from legal and even religious liability (compare the famous 
example of the Sinaic event as in Shab. 86a). 
238 See N. Rakover, Delegation and Authorization in Jewish Law [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 1972). On some 
consequences 
-17. On halakhic discretion as an intentional opposition to the strong temptation to escape 
from responsibility, see P  One Language, 
Different Tongues: Studies in Law, Judaism, and Society [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 201 ), 67-82. 
239 Kidd. 43a. Even without entering here into the debate in this sugiyah between tana kama and Shammai 
(on behalf of 
Sam. 12:9 as a prooftext for the responsibility of 
the sender. As we shall see below, this story too evokes the problem of moral agency. 
240 See Goren, Meshiv , vol.1, 17-18. 
241  
242  
243 See Wallach and Allen, Moral Machines, 206, 208, who note this, but for some reason keep their principal 
line of argument (the possibility of AMA) immune. Denying the punishability of robots implies that Johnson, 
objects, and between having an organic body. The latter, it seems, is constitutive for being identified as 
having moral agency. 
244 On why both properties are deeply entangled (body and subjectivity), see above, sections 3-4. 
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245 Military commands may or may not be immoral,246 but being able 
to refuse is necessary in order to consider a soldier an ethical agent. 




emphasis fits the modern situation, whose problem, as we have seen, is an excess 
 thus an excess of offers for doing. Overwhelmed by our own 
 
reasonable consensus on what decency, honesty, justice, charity bid us to do in 
given circumstances, but great confusion on what we are permitted to do of the 
many things that have become feasible to us, and some of which we must not do on 
any account.247 
 
termed, in the context of AI military ethics, as the Conscientious Objection Versus 
Commandability (COVC) problem: The inherent concern about AWS is that the possibility 
for conscientious objection  which is of profound halakhic significance248 is in deep 
tension with the commandability attempted by the programmers of the AWS.249 It is hard 
to imagine that such an algorithmic component
would, and in fact even could, be programmed.250 The main reason for that is the human 
experience of freedom, and the inability of exhausting the direction of ethical human 
behavior through a set of algorithmic commands (see section 4.3 above). Human ethical 
behavior cannot, in any foreseen future, be duplicated in non-living 
those might be (on human corporeality as an ethical requirement see above section 3.1). 
As long as this specific problem (COVC) is not adequately settled by programmers and 
ethicists, it would be hard to assign halakhic legitimacy to AWS, or to killer robots.  
To conclude this sub-section, the story of the killing the priests of Nob is instructive 
about the ethical role of human agency, which at the same time is telling about the 
importance of conscientious objection. Both moral requirements moral agency and 
refutability cast shadow over the ethicality of AWS.  
 
5.2. Manipulating Agency and the Virtue of Personal Responsibility 
A second biblical case which is instructive for examining AWS (and techno-ethics 
more broadly), is the murder of Uriah the Hittite by King David, for the latter to acquire 
Bathsheba as his own wife (2 Sam. 11). In this case, there is a similar abuse of political 
 
245 This possibility of refusal is an internal and integral part of the IDF ethics. 
see Kasher, Military Ethics. On the later 2000  document, see the IDF website (www.idf.il). It 
is questionable if AWS are permissible by this important ethical code. See below, section 6.2.  
246 See the critique by Yes Judaism, 185-190. 
247 Philosophical Essays, 181. 
248 Due to the awareness of halakhic authorities of the possible conflict between secular authorities and 
religious ones, e.g. Double-Edged 
Sword, 277- d Disobedience [seruv pekudah
[Hebrew],  (Feb. 23, 2005, available at yeshivah.org.il). 
249 
proportionality is even more problematic and is inevitably left to the subjective evaluation of the military 
commander or the soldier on the ground. But the ability to make such subjective evaluations is precisely what 
this argument is compatible with 
another argument by Statman  that if there are any lucid guiding norms for the proportionality of war ethics, 
they should be programable.    
250 On the productive role of emotional intuitions in ethics and consequentially in 
-39. 
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power.251 However, the abuse of power is here camouflaged, rather than made explicit as 
 252 This complex and thoroughly organized causal chain 
is in fact a pre-condition for the success of this murderous operation, as Moshe Halbertal 
and Stephen Holmes contend in their book The Beginning of Politics: Power in the Biblical 
Book of Samuel.253 -manipulation is instructive for reflecting on the 
asserting that ki khazoh vekhazeh tokhal ha erev: imes one way 
Sam 11:25). Halbertal and Holmes explain the meaning of this 
 
 
David deployed a striking metaphor that inadvertently illuminates how rulers 
routinely strive to manipulate the public mind in an effort to dissociate themselves 
along a chain of agents culminates in the perception that the instruments of violence 
254 
 
The singularity of biblical narrative, here as elsewhere, is in the moral critique of its human 
figures.255 Sam. 12:7), Nathan the prophet and the 
biblical narrator make it clear that David is personally 
the crime that he performed.256 This carries a lesson in regard to the targeting of enemy 
combatants by AWS too. On the one hand, war is the place where you defeat your enemy 
by sophistication and deception.257 On the other hand, the reader of 2 Sam. 11 is reminded 
that remoteness from the battlefield does not excuse one from responsibility for the chain 
of events that one has set in motion.258 
Which halakhic-ethical conclusion could be made about AWS, based on this second 
biblical episode? As mentioned earlier, a complete outsourcing of military activity to robots 
will practically put is noteworthy in this 
regard that both Saul and David are indeed taking human agency seriously, even if they try 
to bypass and manipulate it. What happens when this threshold is surpassed is a speculation 
that should be examined carefully, on the social-political level. For in an age of 
259 and facing the shrinking gap between the civilian realm and the 
military battlefield (in Israel this is especially felt260), AWS might bear devastating 
consequences. To examine these questions ethically-halakhically, in their immediate 
 
251 Compare D. Friedman, To Kill and Take Possession: Law, Morality, and Society in Biblical Stories 
(Peabody, MA, 2002), 75-106. 
252 See M. Halbertal and S. Holmes, Beginning of Politics: Power in the Biblical Book of Samuel (Princeton, 
2017), 92. 
253 -99), at 87. 
254 Halbertal and Holmes, Beginning of Politics, 94. 
255 
of fiction worked out by ancient Hebrew writers was to produce a certain indeterminacy of meaning, 
especially with regard to motive, moral character and The Art of Biblical Narrative [New York, 
-
109. 
256 Bauman, Modernity (25-26), warns that as military killing is increasingly being manufactured 
technologically using long range sophisticated weapons, our moral attention to political violence will most 
probably diminish.  
257 As in Prov. 24:6,  
258 As we saw above (by the end of section 4.1), the very distinction between the battlefield and the home-
front [orref] is presently blurred, very much by the increased use of military robotics itself.  
259  
260 Compare Weinberger and Beitner, - . 
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context, we need to ask the basic halakhic and pragmatic question: what difference does it 
make (or, lemai nafqa mina)? 
 
6. AWS: Some Particular Implications and Concerns 
In the previous section we considered the significance of moral agency in the 
public-political sphere. In this section we will point out several concrete ethical challenges 
evoked by AWS in the Israeli context. These will be discussed under the headings of (1) 
Procedure and civil responsibility; (2) Statism and governmental accountability; and (3) 
Idolatry as a humanistic problem. 
 
6.1. Procedure and Civil Responsibility 
As discussed above from multiple angles, the main challenge of AWS is the evasion 
of moral agency. This has practical implications for military and civil ethics. As Asaro 
and 
more likely to become targeted, as civilians, by their enemy.261 By implicitly increasing 
terror pushback, AWS pushes against the biblical commands of Gen. 9:6, to refrain from 
murder, on the one hand, and to execute a convicted murderer by his (or her) fellow 
humans, on the other hand.262 These are intertwined, as human agency is a necessary step 
to carry out the execution of a criminalized person. Furthermore, the commentaries on Gen. 
9:6 assume that the killing of one convicted murderer should be carried out by his (or her) 
fellow human beings subsequent to a public juridical decision, rather than through the 
kol dealim gvar).263 Deut. 17:6-7 makes clear that the 
criminal must be sentenced to death by judges before being executed by the persons who 
witnessed the crime.264 True, this juridical procedure was probably emotionally difficult 
for the persons who witnessed the crime, later testified in court, and had to perform the 
execution.265 However, this burden entailed a serious degree of responsibility. Killing a 
human being (not to say, a full nation) must not be just a click away.266 Such concerns are 
valid in warfare too, as Leiblich and Benvenisti have rightly contended,267 and even more 
so in the civil-encroaching asymmetric warfare. 
Due to the role of embodied268 and verbalized sociality in processes of justice, the 
IDF (and any other advanced army) should consider adopting a general procedure 
instructing that the deployment of offensive UAV requires the presence of at least two 




262 This command is considered a Noahide law that is incumbent on all humanity (Sanh. a-59b). 
263 See J  
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19 (2006), 385, 406. 
264 
one witness he shall not be put to death. The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, 
and afterwa Deut. 17:6-7). On various ramifications of the Mosaic demand for 
Diné Israel 29 (2013), 25-52. 
265 See M. Sanh. 4:5. 
266 Onkelos translated the second half of Gen. 9:6 
ecuted according to judicial 
decision). 
267  
268 See Lorberbaum,  
269 2. Many 
discussions of violent video games warn that it establishes violent habits, heightens the stimulation threshold, 
These Times 
[Hebrew], Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Feb. 2019), available online. 
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but a matter of life and death that requires a basic quorum.270 This would demonstrate how 
Jewish law is decisive to the morality of the IDF. 
 
6.2. Statism and Governmental Accountability 
Another relevant context for the possible incorporation of AWS specifically in the 
IDF involves the unde ut),271 which 
prioritizes the national collective democratic decision making over possible sectorial 
considerations. Following the implications of the biblical stories that Halbertal and Holmes 
discussed and according to early rabbinic law, a king is not allowed to wage war without 
consulting the Sanhedrin (supreme rabbinic council) and consulting the priestly mantic tool 
(urim vetummim).272 This procedural mechanism makes it harder for the king to carry out 
potential capricious military enterprises.273 These checks and balances make the use of 
AWS seem problematic, as it replaces key political agents (such as soldiers) with AI-
operated killer robots. It blurs human combatant accountability, and de-facto erases the 
requirement of soldiers for ethical reason-giving to the democratic civil society which 
sends them.274 
Disconnecting this knot may bring about troubling consequences. From a utilitarian 
out the misuses of 
AWS (see section 1 above). These are not merely hypothetical concerns. Even if one does 
not imagine an army of AWS turning against the population it is intended to defend, the 
replacement of human soldiers will plausibly lead to the replacement of police persons with 
police-AWS. If AWS would be considered ethically adequate for military operations, it is 
hard to conceive why internal political affairs would not be dominated by the same logic 
of algorithmic efficiency. Giving up the representative humane agency of soldiers might 
thus lead to similar processes regarding policemen.275 
The economic-political situation in Israel makes AWS even more challenging. In 
intensified in recent years. This process chall
),276 which 
purpose is to protect a specific nation (am);  (2) the army is owned by a specific nation; (3) 
the army is operated by (human beings?) of this nation; and (4) it is held accountable to 
this nation.277 All those features will be at serious risk278 if a fully-privatized army 
 
270 It is argued that such a procedure (namely, that the soldier is not operating in solitary) diminishes the 
effects of post- nd Drone 
Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College website (April 21, 2014). 
271 -
Mamlakhtiyut Israel Studies 7 (2002), 117-133. 
272 Identified with the  and its elements, worn by the major priest (Num. 27:21 and other biblical 
instances). 
273 Compare Goren, , vol.1 (127-138), who argues in the same manner about the 
representative authority of the Sanhedri -
 
274 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94:2 (2016), 
211-226. 
275 Considering the need for police account
roposes, will solve 
was published). 
276 See Cohen, Divine Service, 23-39, and the references provided there. 
277 ive Challenges to the IDF 
due to the Increasing Use of Non-  9 (2016), 99-126. 
278 Yediot (Dec. 28, 2017). 
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of killer robots, for reasons of economic efficiency. If most of the combat units in the IDF 
will be robotic, the conflict between ethical integrity and financial interests will erupt 
increasingly.279 Even if such a robotic army is governed by authorized representatives, the 
combination between military omnipotence and lack of human agency might cause 
technological abuses and disruptions.280 
The problem goes deeper. The human political social-contract is built on a trade-
off in which humans are expected to contribute their share by serving in the army and 
risking themselves, and at the same time they will be secured by this army. In the formative 
story of 1 Sam. 8:11-18, kingship was therefore criticized for over-taxing and drafting the 
subjects, as a defective condition of the human political setting.281 Is the human role (and 
at times, sacrifice) required for sustaining this political equilibrium the worst trade-off? 
Would a robotic-based sovereignty, with no requirement for humans to be drafted, be 
altogether more beneficial? And for whom, exactly? Could rulers and their milieu not 
succumb to the temptation of abusing their powerful human-free robotic armed-forces 
(namely, AWS) against some of their own people, in cases of severe ideological-societal 
dispute?282 As we identify a strong inclination in technological culture towards 
dictatorship,283 and a decline in the power of investigative journalism,284 and democracy 
more broadly, the basic problem of moral agency in the public-political sphere becomes 
acute.285 As the book by Halbertal and Holmes on the beginning of politics warns, 
disregarding the vitality of moral agency might bring the polity to its end.286 The question 
of moral agency, therefore, must be examined especially against the present-day rise of 
meshillut) discourse, which emphasizes governmental power and 
often undermines the importance of moral checks and balances. The Book of Samuel 
implies that human agency can be an effective safeguard against brutal impulsive 
governmentability.287  
 
6.3. Idolatry as a Humanistic Problem 
The relevance of the concept of idolatry, and its religious normative prohibition, to 
technology and military ethics was presented above (subsection 3.3.1). In normative-laden 
Jewish tradition, as mentioned above, idolatry prohibition is a powerful tool for ethical 
 
279 How would a private robotic militia preserve an ethical code, if such an ethical code is not at all 
Journal of Military Ethics 12 [2013], 
201-224), for example, argues that by a consequentialist criterion (which is typically the ethical measure 
utilized by supporters of AWS, see supra section 4.1), such a privatization is severely problematic. 
280 s 
a post- Divine Service, 39). On the other hand, a total ban on AWS might put Israel in 
existential risk; see the (anonymous authored) article The Danger of Limiting the Development of AI-Based 
Systems for Military Purposes  [Hebrew], Bein Hama'arakhot (2020). 
281 Leviathan, which refers explicitly to 1 Sam. 8. 
282 
st a rival political candidate (Benny Ganz). See the remarks by Adv. Dan 
Cyber Security Research Center, 
March 19, 2019). 
283 See Atlantic (Oct. 2018). 
284 See the Seventh Eye website (www.the7eye.org.il) on harms inflicted to reporters by governments across 
the world.  
285 On the  principle as vital from the perspective of hilkhot tsava (and not only for secular 
Israel), see S. Aviner, , M. Cohen (ed.) (Jerusalem, 1999), 199-200. 
286 
defined by political life, be they kings, officers or subjects. It will serve them as a luminous lens through 
 (Beginning of Politics, 173). 
287 See supra section 5. 
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critique. Differently from a prevalent notion of locating the vice of idolatry merely in the 
theological realm (as transgression against God), NLJT takes seriously the dehumanizing 
ramifications of idolatry.288 An excellent example for this direct
discussion of idolatry-critique as means for ethical social discourse.289 Cohen considers 
290 and Moshe Halbertal and Avishai 
291 The supposition they all share, and see as 
rooted in Jewish tradition, is of idolatry as entangled with ethical transgression in profound 
ways. Erich Fromm, for instance, considered the making of humans into things
versa) as idolatrous. Fromm conceived such instrumentalization as a violation of the 
humanistic values of biblical ethical monotheism.292 To demonstrate this approach, a 
qabbalat 
panim) given in Israel (Dec. 12, 2016) for the F-35 fighter aircrafts, and their naming as 
Adir
some Israelis as idolatrous.293 If airplanes, expensive as they may be, have no face (panim) 
and personality, such reception is indeed problematic. 
All the more so, the ascription of human properties and virtues such as names, 
rights,294 sympathy, and intrinsic value295 to robots (even if not yet AWS) requires a careful 
ethical consideration.296 This problem is exacerbated for the building of human-like AI 
forms.297 
the concept of creation in the image of God298), then there is no distinct problem with 
crediting human status to non-humans.299 From a purely naturalistic point of view,300 it is 
hard to indicate the specific harm inflicted by such a duplication, when a robot is designed 
 
288 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 137-162. On idolatry as a degradation of 
humanity, see H. Hirschensohn, False and True Concepts [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 1932), 86. 
289 nd the Problem of Incommensurability, Philosophical Reflections on 
Educational Theory 49:1 (1999), 71-89. 
290 See Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven, 1950), 93-5, 113-119. 
291 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry.  
292 E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud (New York, 1990), 57-58. 
In a different context, Hans Jonas (Phenomenon of Life, 285) has criticized Heidegger for thingifying humans 
 
293 See  7 (Dec. 13, 2012). 
294 A contemporary example for that is Saudi Arabia, which granted citizenship (!) to the humanoid-robot 
 
295 -robot  ( g a face 
tower of Babel, it is conceivable how an idolatrous attitude towards robots might come at the cost of care for 
s falling [from the tower] they would not pay any attention, however if a building 
block was fallen  [Jerusalem, 1972], ch.24, p.82). Compare 
Fromm, Beyond Illusion, 57-58, an  
296 On personifying objects in transhumanism, see section 3.3 above. A topic which is relevant for the attempt 
-like sex-robots, which merits a separate ethical-halakhic discussion elsewhere. 
297 The Japanese artist Hiroshi Ishiguro is m -
like robot that will be a perfect duplication of a specific human-being (see www.wired.com/2017/10/hiroshi-
ishiguro-when-robots-act-just-like-humans). In the military arena this is surely not the main form of AWS, 
but it no doubt plays a major role in the public imaginary (e.g., in movies such as RoboCop) regarding robotics 
and killer-robots. 
298 See section 3.3. above, and Rabbi J. Sacks, Radical Then, Radical Now: On Being Jewish (London, 2000), 
59-74, esp. . 
299 Gunkel, Machine Question -
(85- -216). For a bolder erasure of 
distinctions between the human and the non-human, see P.P. Verbeek, Moralizing Technology: 
Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things (Chicago, 2011), 21-65. Cf. n.156 above, on the 
fallacies of post-humanism in equating the human to the animal and the inorganic. 
300 Compare supra subsections 3. -3.3. 
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as a specific individual human being, for the sake of manipulation (or killing, on the case 
of AWS).301 However, from the perspective of normative-laden Jewish tradition, such an 
act may count as idolatry.  
The Golem hould 
not give up anything in the pursuit of knowledge, including our attempts for perfection, 
that will allow us to create a human being, but once we figure out that we have indeed 
302 We may be drawn to 
ascribe an anthropomorphic reality to AWS, but from the perspective of NLJT, it only 
deepens the concern that idolatry prohibition did not lose its rationale and ethical necessity. 
Summing up section 6, it seems that from a halakhic perspective which is attentive to 
ethical and societal concerns as well as to the moral resonance of idolatry prohibition, 
serious doubts exist surrounding the possibility of deploying offensive AWS. 
 
7. Afterword 
Technology plays a central role in Israeli (and global) economy, culture, and self-
esteem.303 Many Israelis have ethical sensitivities regarding various techno-ethical issues, 
and care about their traditional ethical commitments, but there still is a relative rabbinic 
silence regarding AWS, even though AI scholars and ethicists worldwide have deep 
concerns about it.304 The aim of this article was to point out the relevance of Jewish 
tradition for the debate over AWS by recalling some established ethical halakhic values 
and norms, and by invoking and provoking the -political imagination.  
Addressing AWS requires an inter-disciplinary discussion of the kind that I tried to 
provide here. For AWS are a product of technology, but cannot be treated properly on a 
purely naturalistic basis if Jewish law and ethics were to be our métier. By arguing that it 
is inherently problematic to grant machines the legitimacy to make decisions on matters of 
life and death, contemporary ethicists echo the imperative of human agency required by 
Gen. 9:6.305 As mentioned earlier, from a halakhic perspective the ethical-legal convictions 
and conventions of non-Jews (including AI scholars such as Sharkey, Asaro, and Sparrow) 
should be taken seriously.306 This article has argued that their substantial concerns about 
AWS cohere with the ethical-political core-values of Jewish tradition. It also demonstrated 
with The Imperative of Responsibility, which argues that the technological extension of the 
moral act requires a parallel extension of our ethical responsibility.307 
This article suggests that AWS should be discussed seriously, and this requires us 
to understand what it means to consider technology in a humane manner. By contrast with 
nderlying Cartesian philosophical model, which domesticates 
AWS discursively, the present article delineates a humane halakhic ethics. In this context, 
it was argued that normative Jewish tradition shares much with humanist philosophies of 
technology, and hence there is a potential for halakhic value-concepts to contribute to the 
 
301 In civil and Jewish law, the proximal type of crime is misrepresentation or impersonating (or ). 
Compare Friedman, To Kill and Take Possession, 62-68. 
302 The Golem: Magical and Mystical Traditions 
in Judaism regarding the Creation of Artificial Human Being [Hebrew], A. Meir-Levi (trans.) (Jerusalem, 
2006), 28. For a critical engagement with the possible applications of a golem to halakhah, see Nevins, 
-38. 
303 Zygon 46 (2011), 413-428. On the 
military-technological aspect, see 415. 
304 See supra sections 1 and 4.2. 
305 This, basically, is the main rationale that Mary Wareham provides against AWS. See her interview on 
Ynet (Sept. 3, 2018, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtvM3m89A8Y). 
306 Compar  
307 Jonas, Responsibility, and compare Wiese, Jonas, 87-
Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 23 (2015), 75-125. 
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wider techno-ethical discourse. To do so, however, not only non-Jewish opinions should 
be taken seriously,308 but also Jewish tradition and its pragmatic-humane voices should, 
inclu  prohibition laws.309 As 
Micah Goodman has argued,310 while in the twentieth century Jews adopted non-Jewish 
universal ideas to solve particular Jewish problems, in the twenty-first century Judaism 
may inspire humanity to address human (technological and other) problems in a Jewish 
humane way.311 The concept of humane moral agency, which was the focus here in the 
case of AWS, is one such ethical challenge to address. I hope that this study will promote 




308 Refraining from doing so does not gran
opposite. See, e.g., the problematic Darwinist influences on Jewish war halakhists. For such an accusation 
against the controversial book Torat Hamelekh, see A. Finkelstein, Derekh Hamelekh [Hebrew] (Netivot, 
2010), 143-144. 
309 
Berkovits, God, Man, and History, 69-108.  
310 Personal conversation (2016). See the third chapter of Goodman s 2019 book Philosophic Roots of the 
Secular-Religious Divide, and his forthcoming book on Judaism and technology. 
311 Shabbat observance, in the broad sense, is a good example for the significance of Jewish custom in the 
digital age: it serves as a model for non-Jewish communities wishing to unplug electronically and reconnect 
interpersonally (see e.g. sabbathmanifesto.org). 
